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Abstract
In two earlier articles (Gagarin 2008, 2012) I argued first, that women could 
own property in their own right and could manage and dispose of it without 
the need of a “guardian” (kyrios), such as we find at Athens, that they could ap-
pear in court on their own as plaintiffs or defendants, and that they had more 
rights in choosing a husband than Athenian women. Second, we can infer from 
the wording of the laws at Gortyn that women’s rights in these respects had 
only recently been granted or had been expanded, and that resistance to these 
greater rights led to greater protection for women in the Gortyn Code. Third, the 
Code suggests, however, that despite these greater rights, most women probably 
continued to live fairly traditional lives, allowing men to manage their property 
as they always had. This paper defends these views against objections raised by 
Alberto Maffi in Maffi 2012 and in this same journal (Dike 15), as well as by two 
anonymous readers.
In due articoli precedenti (Gagarin 2008, 2012) ho sostenuto che le donne 
potevano essere proprietarie di beni, e potevano amministrarli e disporre di essi 
senza bisogno dell’intervento di un tutore (kyrios), quale troviamo invece ad At-
ene; che potevano stare in giudizio per proprio conto sia in veste di attore che di 
convenuto, e che avevano maggiore libertà di scegliersi un marito rispetto alle 
donne ateniesi. In secondo luogo possiamo desumere dal testo delle leggi di Gor-
tina che i diritti delle donne riguardo a questi punti sono stati garantiti o addi-
rittura accresciuti solo in tempi recenti, e che la resistenza a questo ampliamento 
dei loro diritti ha condotto a una protezione accentuata delle donne nel Codice 
di Gortina. In terzo luogo il Codice induce a ritenere che, nonostante questo ac-
crescimento di diritti, la maggior parte delle donne probabilmente continuava 
a vivere secondo canoni tradizionali, consentendo agli uomini di amministrare 
i loro beni come era sempre avvenuto. Questo articolo ribadisce questi punti di 
vista contro le obiezioni sollevate da Alberto Maffi 2012 e in questo stesso nu-
mero della rivista (Dike 15), nonché da due anonimi revisori.
In May of 2012 the University of Sannio in Benevento held a confer-
ence celebrating the career of Eva Cantarella.1 On this happy occasion 
Alberto Maffi and I both gave papers about women at Gortyn, which 
1. I am grateful to the organizers, and especially Professor Aglaia McClintock, 
for the invitation to participate and the hospitality extended to me during my visit.
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were published in a volume of Index (Gagarin 2012, Maffi 2012). These 
papers were written independently of each other, and after the meet-
ing Alberto suggested that we carry on the discussion in the pages of 
this journal, in which a few years ago I had published my first close 
examination of women at Gortyn (Gagarin 2008).2 To begin the discus-
sion I wrote the following comments (Part A) about Maffi 2012, focus-
ing specifically on the matroia (“beni materni” or “maternal estate”), 
the subject of his paper. I sent these comments to him, and he then 
wrote the response that follows these pages, addressing first, my 2008 
paper, second, my 2012 paper, and third, the recent comments I sent 
him (Part A). I in turn have added a response to some of Maffi’s new 
points (Part B). In order not to confuse the issue, I have left my initial 
version of A (the version sent to Maffi) unchanged except for minor 
corrections.
Part A
Before beginning, let me make two methodological points. First, in 
interpreting the Gortyn laws, I begin with what the text says and try 
to understand it in itself. Then if necessary, I look to other laws from 
Gortyn, and occasionally to laws from other Cretan cities, for help. 
Only then, if necessary, do I take into consideration how Athenian law 
or Roman law (or some other system) may have treated a similar situ-
ation. A case in point is Maffi’s view that in most situations Gortynian 
women were subject to a guardianship arrangement (“tutela”) similar 
to that of Athenian women, even though the words “guardian” and 
“guardianship” (kyrios, kyrieia) never appear in any Gortynian law. To 
be sure, it is clear that a woman’s property was sometimes managed 
by a male relative, but nothing in the laws prohibits a woman from 
managing her own property or requires her to have a guardian. It is 
clear, moreover, that in some cases at least a woman could manage 
her property herself.3 Thus, if we confine ourselves to what the laws 
actually say, we cannot conclude that Gortynian women were subject 
to a guardianship.
My second general point is that the laws are selective in the top-
ics they address and the specific rules they prescribe. The absence of 
some topic or rule from the Code should not automatically be taken 
2. This paper was particularly inspired by, and indebted to Maffi’s work, 
especially Maffi 1997 and 2003.
3. In addition to the frequent mention in the laws that a woman should have 
“her own property” (ta wa autas kremata), the clearest evidence is a provision 
in the Gortyn Code which explicitly allows an heiress to handle a financial 
transaction by herself: “if someone owing money should leave behind an heiress, 
she, either herself or through her paternal and maternal relatives (ἒ αὐτὰν ἒ διὰ 
τὸνς πάτροανς καὶ τὸνς μάτροανς), is to mortgage or sell (property) etc.” (9.1-
7). The argument that “herself” might mean that she has the help of her kyrios 
(Maffi 1997: 106; 2003: 192) cannot be correct, because a kyrios would always be 
one of her relatives, and the alternatives “either herself [sc. through her kyrios] 
or through a relative” would be the same.
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to mean that the law did or did not require or allow something. For 
example, if the law explicitly allows a son to do something, it does 
not necessarily mean that a daughter could not do the same thing. 
Rather, it may mean only that problems have arisen or seem likely 
to arise with regard to sons acting in this way but not with regard to 
daughters, and this may in turn mean only that sons acted thus more 
often or more aggressively than daughters. Only if there is some good 
reason to expect daughters to be mentioned along with sons, can we 
conclude that their absence from the law is significant.
Turning now to Maffi’s treatment of “beni materni,” I begin by 
observing (as others have) that the word matroia is modeled on the 
more common Greek word patroia or “paternal estate.” Maffi notes 
(91) that the Attic form is μητρῶα and that we find “the same situa-
tion at Athens (93), but in fact there is no Attic form of this word, for 
the obvious reason that the treatment of women’s property was fun-
damentally different in Athens. In Crete,4 aside from one fragmentary 
occurrence of matroia at Phaistos (Di Vita and Cantarella 1978), ma-
troia and patroia are found only at Gortyn; and wherever the context is 
clear, they always occur in the context of inheritance.5 The two terms 
appear together in two passages in the Code (4.44-5, 11.43-45), where 
it is strongly implied that they designate the same kind of property 
belonging to the mother or father respectively; matroia also occurs 
without patroia at 6.34 and 6.45.6
Maffi sets out his position at the beginning (91-93): matroia is a 
mother’s estate and must thus be understood in context of the nu-
clear family and the mother’s role in it, as both wife and mother. His 
study then proceeds systematically, examining first the ways a wom-
an’s patrimony could be constituted, then changes that might occur 
in this patrimony, and finally ways of transmitting it to others.7 I will 
generally follow this arrangement, though the three parts are obvi-
ously interconnected.
I
Maffi begins (94) by examining the first of several rules about mis-
using the property of other family members (6.2-9):
4. The two words also occur together in a later inscription from Tegea about 
exiles returning and claiming their property. I discuss this text briefly at the end 
of this paper.
5. The context is unclear in IC 4.20.4 (matroia), IC 4.21.5 (patroia), and in the 
one example at Phaistos (matroia), but in all of these inheritance is possible.
6. All references to passages in Cretan laws are to the Gortyn Code (IC 4.72) 
unless otherwise indicated.
7. Maffi speaks often of women’s “patrimony” rather than her “property,” 
thereby subtly reinforcing the idea that a woman’s property must be understood 
in a familial context. He does not often use this language when speaking of men’s 
property.
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ἆς κ’ ὀ πατὲδ δόει, τν τ π-
ατρὸς κρεμάτον πὰρ υἰέος 
μὲ ὀνθθαι μεδὲ καταθίθ-
εθθαι, ἄτι δέ κ’ αὐτὸς πάσετ-
αι ἒ ἀπολάκει ἀποδιδόθθο, 
αἴ κα λι· μεδὲ τὸν πατέρα τὰ τ-
ν τέκνον ἄτι κ’ αὐτοὶ πάσον-
ται ἒ ἀπολάκοντι.
5
As long as the father is 
living, no one is to buy any 
of the father’s property 
from a son or accept it as 
security, but whatever (the 
son) himself has acquired or 
inherited, let him sell it, if 
he wishes; nor is the father 
(to sell or pledge as security) 
his children’s property, 
whatever they themselves 
have acquired or inherited.
As Maffi notes, the provision in 6.2-7 allows a son to sell property he 
has acquired or inherited but says nothing about a daughter being able 
to do this. He explains that this is because girls do not have any property 
that they can sell. But we should note that the next provision (6.7-9) pro-
hibits a father from selling his children’s property (ta ton teknon). This im-
plies that all the children, including the daughters, could have property 
that could be sold. So we need to look again at Maffi’s arguments that a 
daughter could not inherit or acquire property that was hers to sell.
The law makes clear (5-6) that sons could acquire or inherit prop-
erty of their own. Let us consider inheritance first. How can a son 
have inherited property when his father is still alive, as he clearly is? 
Maffi’s solution is that the verb apolankanen does not mean “inherit,” 
as I have translated it, but rather “anticipate an inheritance” (Maffi 
1997: 36-38): the son has not actually received this property, but an-
ticipates receiving it as part of his inheritance. This is impossible: if 
the son has not yet received the property, then it still belongs to his 
father, and the law cannot in one clause prohibit a son from selling 
his father’s property and then in the next clause allow him to sell it.8 
Apolankanen must, in fact, mean inherit,9 and since the boy’s father 
is still alive, it must refer to a distribution of property made by one 
parent while still alive, which is implicitly allowed in 4.27-31.10 It 
8. The same is true of the father selling his son’s property in 5.7-9, where the 
language is the same.
9. Apolankanen also occurs in 5.1, 5.4, 5.7, and 7.34. The first three all refer 
to a daughter’s inheritance (which Maffi argues is not actually hers). I leave 
these aside because the fourth occurrence seems decisive. This comes in the 
long section containing rules for the marriage of an “heiress,” specifically a rule 
providing that if either the heiress or the person designated to be her husband 
has not reached puberty, “she is to have (eken) the house, if there is one, and he 
is to receive (apolankanen) half of all the revenue from the estate” (7.31-35). It 
would make no sense for the law to say, “he is to anticipate receiving half of all 
the revenue,” since he knows that when they eventually marry, the couple will 
receive all of the revenue. Clearly the law is giving each of them some part of the 
estate before they are married -- to her the house, to him half of the revenue.
10. The law at 4.27-31 says that the parents do not have to divide their 
property while they are alive, implying that they may divide it if they wish. If 
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cannot refer to property inherited from the boy’s mother, since the 
father would still control this (see 6.31-46). Thus, the law can only 
mean that a son can dispose as he wishes of any property he has re-
ceived as a distribution from one of his parents while the parent was 
still alive.
The law also refers to property the son has acquired. How would he 
acquire it? Maffi’s first suggestion is booty from war. This is possible, 
though there is no mention of booty in any Gortynian law, and only 
rarely is there any mention of something military. The other means 
of acquiring property, Maffi suggests, was commercial activity, which 
a son could engage in because he can anticipate receiving an inherit-
ance. Here too, it makes no sense to talk of his using an anticipated 
inheritance for commerce, but the son may well have used the inherit-
ance he actually received as a partial distribution.
What about girls? Inheritance, according to the laws, was divided 
among all the children, so daughters would get a share along with 
the sons. Their share would be smaller, much smaller in some cases 
(depending on how much of the estate consisted of city houses), but 
they certainly received something. Maffi argues that any inheritance 
a girl received would not actually be hers to dispose of as she wished 
but rather would have the character of a nuptial gift, similar to an 
Athenian dowry, which could only be transmitted, eventually, to her 
children or other heirs. The evidence for this is that the law allows 
a father, if he wishes, to give his daughter a gift when she is getting 
married worth up to the amount of her share of inheritance, after 
which she is not to receive anything more (4.48-5.1). In essence, she 
can receive her inheritance when she is married. For Maffi, this gift 
would function like a dowry: nominally it might belong to the girl, but 
in fact it would go to her husband, who would manage it for her until 
it was eventually transmitted to her heirs.11
The problems with this are first, the law says that a daughter’s fa-
ther may give a gift to her when she is getting married (tai opuiomenai, 
4.49-50); it says nothing about her husband.12 Clearly, the daughter 
herself receives the gift. Second, because the gift was voluntary, some 
daughters did not receive a gift but instead received their share of the 
inheritance when their father died. Here too, the law says explicitly 
one of the heirs is fined, however, then a distribution should be given out to pay 
the fine.
11. The last sentence in this passage (4.52-5.1) says, “any (daughter) to whom 
he gave or promised before is to have (eken) these things, but from the paternal 
estate she is not to receive (apolankanen) any other property. Even if one accepts 
Maffi’s interpretation of the second verb as “anticipate an inheritance” (see 
above, n.7), the first verb (eken) certainly means she is to have the property in 
question.
12. Similarly, the speaks of a son giving “to his mother” (matri) and a husband 
giving “to his wife” (gynaiki), saying nothing about the involvement of another 
male relative (12.1-2, cf. 10.14-15).
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that the daughter “receives” (lankanen) her inheritance (4.39-43, 4.47-
48), just as her brothers do. It also says that all the children, sons and 
daughters, are to “have” (eken) or “receive” (dialankanen) their share 
(5.12-13, 5.50-51). Thus, the law is clear: the daughter’s share is given 
to her, not to her husband or brother.
In seeking a different interpretation of this evidence, Maffi argues 
(94-96) that the daughter might receive the gift or inheritance, but 
would immediately transmit it to her husband or (if she was not mar-
ried) her brother. Only if a woman was widowed or divorced after her 
father has died, and went to her brother’s house, would Maffi consider 
her the owner of her inheritance. Thus, he argues, in most cases inher-
itance had a dotal function, just as a father’s gift did. As a result, the 
only significant difference from Athens is that at Gortyn the amount 
of the dotal gift is specified by law.
The one piece of evidence Maffi cites for his view of inheritance is from 
the section on adoption: “if the adopter has natural children, with the 
male (heirs) the adopted son will receive a share in the same way as daugh-
ters from their brothers” (10.48-52). For Maffi this shows that a daughter’s 
inheritance first went to her brothers and only later (when she was mar-
ried) to her. But if that were the meaning of 10.48-52, then the adopted 
son would receive his share of the inheritance from the natural sons only 
when he was married. This seems highly unlikely. It is far more likely that 
when children received their inheritance, the brothers handled the dis-
tribution of the estate giving each sister her share; if there is an adopted 
son, they give him his share “in the same way.”
Other sorts of gifts are more difficult to fit into Maffi’s dotal sche-
ma. I leave aside a mother’s gift, which is not mentioned in the laws, 
though Maffi is probably correct to assume it was allowed (97). Hus-
bands and sons, however, are explicitly allowed to give gifts (10.14-
17, 12.1-5). A husband might give his bride a nuptial gift at the time 
of their wedding, but the other information the Code gives about a 
husband’s gift suggests a different motive. This is a provision in the 
passage that specifies what happens if one spouse dies (3.17-37). The 
passage begins, “if a man should die leaving children, if his wife wish-
es, she is to marry, having her own things and whatever her husband 
gives her (κἄτι κ’ ὀ ἀνὲδ δι) according to what is written in the pres-
ence of three adult free witnesses” (17-20). Since similar lists of prop-
erty a woman may keep, e.g. in a divorce (2.45-54), do not mention a 
husband’s gift, Maffi argues (98) that only in anticipation of his own 
death could a husband give his wife a gift, which might be a nuptial 
gift if she remarried.13 This is certainly possible, but one wonders in 
how many cases a husband did in fact anticipate his own death in time 
to arrange a gift in the presence of three witnesses. It is more likely 
13. If she did not remarry, of course, it would not be nuptial gift, which is 
one reason Maffi prefers to see the gift as given in anticipation of death (donatio 
mortis causa). His other reason is that the verb didomi is absent in 3.17-20, but 
since the verb is in fact present in this passage (cited above), this must just be a 
careless error.
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that a husband could give his wife a gift at any time, and she would 
keep this during a divorce, though he could dispute it if she claimed a 
gift that he had not given her. If he died, on the other hand, he would 
not be there to dispute a gift that his widow claimed he had given her, 
and so the law requires witnesses to confirm it.
A son’s gift is more difficult for Maffi to explain (98-99). Neither a 
nuptial gift nor a gift in anticipation of (the son’s) death seems likely, 
since only rarely would a mother marry when she had no father or 
brother to give her away and her son was of an age to do this, and it 
would be equally rare that a son predeceased his mother. Maffi seems 
never to consider the possibility that a person might give a gift for 
much more simple reasons -- as a mark of gratitude, for instance, or 
simply for pleasure. This might help explain the limits the law impos-
es on the amount of these gifts: these would protect the property of a 
man who -- so a legislator might think -- might be swayed too easily 
by his love for his wife or his fear of a dominating mother to give over 
large amounts of their property. For Maffi, gifts must always have 
been functional, and the function was usually dotal and was closely 
connected with the dotal function of inheritance.
Besides inheritance and gifts, there may have been other means for 
girls to acquire property. Maffi is undoubtedly correct that girls would 
not acquire war booty. He also argues that they would not be able to en-
gage in commercial activity because they would have no income from 
work they did, such as weaving. This argument requires further examina-
tion. The Code first mentions weaving in the section on divorce (2.45-52):
αἴ κ’ ἀνὲρ [κ]αὶ γυ-
νὰ διακρ[ί]νον[τ]αι, τὰ ϝὰ α-
ὐτᾶς ἔκεν, ἄτι ἔκονσ’ ιε π-
ὰρ τὸν ἄνδρα, καὶ τ καρπ τ-
ὰνν ἐμίναν, αἴ κ’ ι ἐς τν ϝ-
ν αὐτᾶς κρεμάτον, κὀτι




If a husband and wife are 
divorced, she is to have her 
own things, whatever she 
had when she came to her 
husband, and half of the 
produce, if there is any from 
her own property, and half of 
what she has woven, what-
ever it is, etc.
In a divorce, the wife takes first “her own things,” which she brought 
to the marriage. In addition she takes half of the produce from her 
own property, if there is any, and half of whatever she has woven. 
These categories seem straightforward and scholars have said little 
about them, but it is worth asking what they are and how the wife’s 
share is determined. The produce is presumably agricultural produce 
from the land, and the qualification “if there is any” probably indi-
cates that some girls came to a marriage with property that did not 
include land, though others must have had land.14
14. Maffi agrees that women at Gortyn could inherit land among other things 
(96-97). For my arguments on the subject see Gagarin 2010:24-25, to which add 
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If a woman did own land which yielded produce, how did she de-
termine her share in a divorce? Did she take half of whatever produce 
happened to be in the house at the time, which might be a very dif-
ferent amount depending on when during the agricultural cycle the 
divorce took place? And if so, did the couple then divide each kind 
of produce -- grain, fruit, figs, etc. -- in half so that she could take 
her share of each? And because she could only take the produce from 
her own property, the family must have stored each kind of produce 
in two separate containers, one for the produce from her land and 
one for her husband’s? If they stored all the produce from both lands 
together, it would be impossible to separate out half of the produce 
that had originally come from the woman’s property. Finally, the task 
of carrying away the produce, which might amount to a very large 
quantity if the divorce occurred right after the harvest, could be quite 
difficult. All in all, it would be much easier to calculate the value of 
each product as it was harvested from each piece of land and then in 
a divorce allow the wife to take an amount of money equivalent to 
half the produce from her land.15 And the value could be calculated 
on an annual basis so that it made no difference what time of year the 
divorce took place.16
What about the items she had woven? These were not perishable 
and could be more easily divided than produce, but here too it makes 
more sense to think of the value than of the items themselves. Most 
of what she had woven was probably clothing, and this would have 
included clothes for her husband and herself, and for their children if 
there were any. In a divorce, she would have no use for her husband’s 
or children’s’ clothing, but if she took only what she had woven for 
herself, this would often be less than half the total, sometimes much 
less. It seems more likely, therefore, that she would take whatever 
she had woven for herself, and if this was less than half of the total 
amount she had woven (or more than half), she would then calculate 
the additional amount she would receive (or the amount she would 
have to return).
the provision in the Code concerning inheritance “if there should be no kremata 
but only a house” (4.46-48). Since anyone with a house would have to have some 
small items of property in addition to the house, it appears that kremata here 
designates primarily land.
15. There is evidence that the value of produce from land was sometimes 
calculated in another law from Gortyn (IC 4.43Ba, lines 7-9), which states that 
when a person has been given public land, “someone cannot accept a pledge on 
that land unless he calculates [lit. “measures”] the revenue it will produce (μηδ’ 
ἐνεκυράδδεν αἰ μὴ ἐπι[μ]ετρ[ῆι] τὰν ἐπικαρπίαν). This suggest that there may 
have been standard values for different kinds of produce and even a standard 
calculation of the value of produce from a certain amount of land. The same may 
have been true for woven products.
16. The woman probably took half of the produce only from the year in which 
the divorce took place, not from all the years the couple were married, because 
if the couple were married for many years, the total value of the produce (most 
of which may have been consumed) might be larger than the total amount of 
property the household currently possessed.
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All this evidence together shows that a girl whose inheritance in-
cluded land would receive revenue from that property. She would also 
be able to weave items of value, which in some cases may have been 
sold to produce additional revenue. We do not have much evidence 
for markets for agricultural or woven products, but the clear evidence 
that money circulated at Gortyn at this time means that the sale of 
surplus goods was possible, whether or not formal markets existed 
for them.17 And this means that women, whether married or not, did 
have ways to acquire property besides inheritance and gifts from male 
relatives.
Finally, if daughters did have property of their own, why does the 
provision in 6.2-7 (cited above) allow a son to sell his property but say 
nothing of a daughter selling her property? For Maffi (94) this is an 
obvious indication that a daughter could not sell her property; I would 
argue, however, that in general the law addresses situations that oc-
cur frequently or that have caused or are likely to cause problems, and 
since girls were less likely to want to sell their property, the law did 
not bother to include them. Fathers, on the other hand, would be just 
as likely to try to sell a daughter’s property as to sell a son’s, so in 7-9, 
the law specifies “children,” which presumably includes daughters.
In sum, Maffi concludes that all the property a woman received from 
gifts and inheritance came from members of her nuclear family and 
must be understood in this context. In almost all cases the property 
had a dotal function and was only nominally the woman’s property, 
since it was managed by her husband or other relative and was to be 
transmitted at her death only to her children or other heirs. The laws, 
on the other hand, consistently speak of a girl receiving her inherit-
ance, or having “her own property,” and of a father, son, or husband 
giving a gift to his daughter, mother, or wife. No other male relative is 
mentioned in connection with either inheritance or a gift. This is com-
pletely different from the language Athenians use about the dowry, 
namely that a father first negotiates the amount of the dowry with 
his daughter’s husband-to-be and then gives it to him, not to her. At 
Gortyn, by contrast, the law speaks of the woman herself receiving or 
having property (sometimes “her own property”), and we must accept 
that the law means what it says: the property is hers, she receives it, 
she keeps it, she has it. In short, she owns it. She may let someone 
else manage it for her, but it remains hers and if it is mismanaged, 
she regains control of it (6.9-31 -- see below). If she is married, half 
of the produce that comes from her property is also hers, as is half 
of whatever she weaves. Presumably, if she is not married, all of the 
produce is hers, as is any profit from her weaving. She can also acquire 
property by buying, selling, lending, and borrowing, just as men can.
Maffi addresses one last question about how the matroia are ac-
quired -- whether or not slave women could acquire matroia (100-101). 
17. We do know that there was a market for slaves at Gortyn, because a law 
regulated the sale of slaves in the agora (7.10-15).
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The main evidence is a short passage about the separation of serf cou-
ples (3.40-44):
αἴ κ-
α ϝοικέος ϝοικέα κριθι δο 
ἒ ἀποθανόντος, τὰ ϝὰ αὐτᾶ-
ς ἔκεν· ἄλλο δ’ αἴ τι πέροι, ἔνδ-
ικον ἔμεν. vac.
40 If a serf woman is sepa-
rated from her serf husband 
either while he is living or by 
his death, she is to have her 
own things, but if she should 
carry away anything else, it is 
a matter for trial. vac.
The language here is remarkably similar to that used in addressing 
the divorce of a free couple (2.45-52, cited above), but there is no men-
tion of produce or weaving, probably because regulations concern-
ing slaves are generally more condensed than those concerning free 
people,18 as indeed this provision combines separation by divorce and 
death, which are treated separately for free persons.
Be that as it may, can we consider “her own things” (ta wa autas) to 
be her matroia? Like many scholars, Maffi assumes that slaves did not 
truly own property; rather, all the property that slaves are said to have 
in fact belonged to their owners, in the same way as the Roman pecu-
lium -- property that was often treated as if it were the slave’s but that 
by law belonged to his master. Here at Gortyn, however, it is the law, 
not everyday speech, that states that the serf woman is to have “her 
own things.” The clear implication is that these are her property de iure 
not just de facto. If this is the case, it removes another difficulty facing 
Maffi, who has to assume that the law only addresses the separation 
of couples belonging to different owners. The law’s purpose, Maffi ar-
gues, is to ensure that when a serf woman returns to her master after a 
divorce or her husband’s death, she brings with her “her own things,” 
which for Maffi are actually her master’s things. In this way, the intent 
of this law is to allow the owner to reclaim his property.
But if this is what the law means, we must ask first, why does it 
not say explicitly that the serfs belong to different owners; second, 
why does it not speak of “her owner’s things” rather than “her own 
things”; and third, why does the law not direct the serf woman’s own-
er to claim his property rather than letting the serf woman claim it? 
If Maffi’s view is correct, a serf woman with children who is divorced 
or whose husband has died would have good reason not to take her 
things (which for Maffi are her owner’s things) with her but to leave 
them with her children or with her husband for the benefit of her 
children. The law, however, does not seem concerned about the pos-
sibility that she might take less than she owns, only that she might 
take more. It makes far more sense, therefore, to understand the law 
to mean what it says: when serfs are separated, regardless of whether 
18. It is likely that slaves did not own land and thus did not have produce, but 
it seems unlikely that slave women did not weave anything.
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they have the same or different owners, the woman is to take her own 
property with her.19
Whether a serf woman’s own things would have been considered 
her matroia is impossible for us to know, just as we have no evidence 
regarding whether or how the property of serfs was inherited by 
their children.
II
Maffi next takes up the question, whether matroia could be freely 
disposed of, and if so, who was authorized to dispose of them (101-2). 
His answer is that the dotal function of matroia meant that they were 
inalienable; the law authorized only two exceptions, to pay a woman’s 
debts and to allow her to give a small amount for komistra (see below).
The first exception is mentioned in 11.42-45: “the patroia are liable 
for debts incurred by the father, the matroia for those incurred by the 
mother” (ἀτ̣έθαι δὲ ὐπὲρ μὲν τ [πα]τρὸς τὰ πατρια, ὐπὲ‹δ› δὲ τᾶς 
ματρὸς τὰ ματρια). This is the only provision in the Code that men-
tions the matroia being used to pay for something rather than being 
inherited, though the context (11.31-45) is still inheritance (see be-
low). Maffi concludes that paying a woman’s debts is the only legiti-
mate use for matroia; but we certainly cannot presume such a degree 
of completeness in the Code that any matter not explicitly allowed 
was therefore prohibited. In fact, many other laws written around the 
same time as the Code have survived, most of them fragmentary, and 
we must assume that many others were written that have not sur-
vived. Moreover, we must understand the law in 11.42-45 in its con-
text, as part of a larger set of laws concerning estates of parents who 
have incurred debts (11.31-45): if the heirs wish to inherit a parent’s 
estate, they must pay any debts the parent incurred while alive; if 
they do not, then the estate will go to the creditors. The provision in 
question (42-45) prevents one parent’s estate from being used to pay 
the debts of the other parent. Nowhere is there any hint that the ma-
troia could only be used to pay for a woman’s debts.
Other objections to Maffi’s conclusion are first, if we infer that the 
matroia could be used for nothing other than paying debts, we must 
draw the same inference about the patroia, since the language of the 
law is identical concerning the two estates. And no one thinks that 
the father’s property could not be used for anything other than pay-
ing his debts. Second, if a woman could do nothing with her matroia 
except pay an existing debt, she would never incur a debt in the first 
place, because she would have no property that she could dispose of 
19. I leave out of consideration here the final clause cited above, that if there 
is a dispute over what the woman takes, “it is a matter for trial.” The wording 
suggests that the trial would be between the woman and her (former) husband, 
just as for free persons (3.5-8), but for Maffi, “notwithstanding the wording of 
the Code” (101), the law means that the two owners will go to trial.
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for any other purpose. It is clear, therefore, that to interpret 11.42-45 
as restricting the use of matroia to the payment of debts, as Maffi does, 
makes no sense. Rather, a woman could dispose of her property as she 
wished, but if she died leaving debts, the law says that these must be 
paid from her matroia.
In resisting this conclusion, Maffi notes that a woman’s father, hus-
band, and son (and probably brothers too) are all prohibited from dis-
posing of a woman’s property (6.9-31). Maffi rejects the possibility that 
a woman could dispose of her property herself, observing (correctly) 
that “to prohibit a husband or son from disposing of the property of 
his wife or mother does not imply that the women in question could 
dispose of their own property” (202). However, the passage that intro-
duces these prohibitions (6.2-9, cited and discussed above) suggests 
that the implication may be valid. 6.2-5 prohibit a son from disposing 
of his father’s property, but no one thinks a father could not dispose 
of his own property. 6.7-9 then prohibit a father from disposing of 
his children’s property, but this is preceded by 6.5-7, which explicitly 
allow a son to dispose of his own property. Clearly, laws prohibiting 
X from disposing of the property of Y do not mean that Y could not 
dispose of his own property. In fact, in 6.2-9 at least, Y certainly is 
allowed to dispose of his own property. Thus, prohibitions against a 
male relative disposing of a woman’s property do not mean that she 
could not dispose of her property herself.20
Part of the reason for Maffi’s reluctance to accept this conclusion 
is that he thinks that a Gortynian woman could only act through a 
guardian, who would be a male relative, and since these are prohibited 
from acting, she herself would also be unable to act. But this assump-
tion is unwarranted and unnecessary (see above n.3). Even if a woman 
did not need a guardian, however, Maffi insists that the “dotal func-
tion” of matroia imposed restrictions on the use of a woman’s property 
so that it was not freely alienable. 
The one exception he allows is for komistra, which is the subject of 3.37-40:
κόμιστρα αἴ κα λι δόμεν 
ἀνὲρ ἒ γυνά, ἒ ϝμα ἒ δυόδεκ-
α στατρανς ἒ δυόδεκα στατ-
έρον κρέος, πλίον δὲ μέ.
40
If a husband or wife wish to 
give something for komistra, 
(it should be) either clothing 
or twelve staters or (some-
thing) of the value of twelve 
staters, but not more.
This law follows a group of laws concerning the division of property 
after the death of one spouse, and many scholars have thus understood 
komistra (a word that is otherwise unknown) to mean something con-
nected with burial (Maffi 1997: 63-64). Whatever the word means, the 
law is clearly intended to limit the expense. It is not intended to pro-
20. For more detailed comments on 6.2-46 see Gagarin 2008: 12-16
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vide an exception to the rule that a woman’s property is inalienable, 
since in that case there would be no reason to mention the husband’s 
gift and the law would only mention the woman. In fact, by limiting 
the amount a wife can give for komistra, the law implies that she, like 
her husband, can give money for other purposes without limitation.
III
Maffi next examines the inheritance of matroia, which follows the 
same rules as the inheritance of patroia (4.43-46, 5.9-54), leading him 
to conclude (102) that both estates could contain the same types of 
property. I would agree. He then turns to rules specific to the matroia 
in 6.31-46: if a woman dies leaving children, her husband manages her 
matroia, but he cannot sell any of her property or use it as security 
without the consent of the adult children. This is a reasonable pro-
tection of the children, who will eventually inherit the matroia. Maffi 
then suggests that any proceeds from a sale or a loan backed by the 
security of the matroia would probably go to the father. I think it more 
likely that the proceeds would be added to the matroia, but since the 
children will eventually inherit their father’s estate, perhaps it would 
not matter very much whether the proceeds remained part of the ma-
troia or went to the father, where they would become part of his pa-
troia, which the children would eventually inherit.
Because the matroia will probably not actually be distributed to 
the children until the father’s death (in accordance with 6.31-46), a 
daughter may have long since been married, and Maffi acknowledges 
(103) that the share of the matroia that she would receive at that time 
would not be tied to any “dotal function” but would be her “personal 
property.” He does not pursue the implications of this, but his words 
(“personal property”) imply that the daughter could do whatever she 
wanted with this particular property.
Maffi then observes that if a husband dies before his wife, the law 
only addresses cases where she leaves to marry or return home (3.17-
31); presumably he thinks that her matroia would in that case be man-
aged by her new husband or her relatives at home. However, the law 
also implicitly allows the widow to stay with her children in which 
case, according to Maffi, the children will manage her matroia accord-
ing to the rule in 6.9-12. But this law, which prohibits a son from mis-
using his mother’s property does not require him to manage it, nor 
does it prohibit her from doing so. And if the children are very young, 
of course, they will not be able to manage her matroia. Maffi’s solution 
is that the patroia of the deceased father would be managed by one of 
his relatives -- possibly, but nothing in the law prevents his widow 
from managing the patroia; this relative, according to Maffi, would 
then also be the widow’s guardian, though it is not clear who would 
manage the matroia. In the end Maffi admits that this problem does 
not exist for those who think a Gortynian woman could manage her 
own property without the need for a kyrios. In fact, this is only one of 
the many issues concerning the matroia at Gortyn that are needlessly 
86 Michael Gagarin
complicated and confused by the assumption that women needed a 
guardian like the Athenian kyrios.
Maffi then (103-4) briefly mentions two more cases in which the 
matroia appear not to have a dotal function, when a woman decides to 
rear a son (why not a daughter?) born after she is divorced (3.44-52), 
and when a woman has children while married to and living with a 
slave (6.56-7.10). In neither case is there any difficulty if we assume 
that the woman herself could manage any property she possessed, 
whatever its source, and that it would be inherited by her children or 
other relatives when she died.
Maffi next takes up the very difficult case of adoption (10.33-11.23), 
concerning which the law focuses primarily on the inheritance that 
the adopted son will receive from his adopting father (10.39-11.10); it 
says nothing about his inheriting anything from his natural mother 
or his adoptive mother. Nonetheless, Maffi asks whether an adopted 
son would inherit from either of these, and then speculates about sev-
eral hypothetical situations. Would an adopted son whose adoptive 
mother dies be able to give his adoptive father permission to sell her 
property (see 6.31-36)? If the husbands of the natural and the adoptive 
mothers die leaving her an heiress, if the two mothers have only one 
son between them, which mother is treated as having a child and thus 
being under no compulsion to marry (according to 8-30-36)? 
These hypothetical questions arise because Maffi assumes that at 
Gortyn, as at Athens (see Isaeus 7.25), an adopted son preserved ties to 
his natural mother. There is no evidence, however, that this was the 
rule at Gortyn, and a short clause that Maffi omits (11.5-6) suggests 
that he did not. 11.5-6 follows regulations that allow the adopted son 
to inherit a share of the estate from his adoptive father even if there 
are also natural children. The law also allows the adopted son not to re-
ceive the inheritance in this case, but then states (11.5-6), “the adopted 
son is not to receive more.”21 It is uncertain just what this means,22 but 
the most likely interpretation, in my view, is that it means the adopted 
son is not to receive anything from other sources, namely his natural 
parents, and thus that unless the adoption is renounced (11.10-17), the 
adopted son does not have ties to his natural parents, at least not as 
regards inheritance. The responses I would give, therefore, to Maffi’s 
questions are first that yes, the adopted son is able to give permission 
21. πλίυι δὲ τὸν ἀνπαντὸμ μὲ ἐπικορέν. The reason Maffi does not consider 
this clause is because, as he has argued in an earlier work (1997: 81), he thinks 
epikoren does not mean “receive,” as most other scholars understand it, but has 
its more common (Attic) sense “concede.” In his view, the provision prohibits 
the adopted son from “conceding” (i.e. giving) one of the adopter’s daughters a 
larger amount than she is supposed to receive when she is married (see 5.1-9). 
But there would be no reason to use the verb “concede” instead of “give,” which 
is used of gifts everywhere else in the Code.
22. Willetts takes it to mean that the adopted son is not to receive more than 
the females, but this would be superfluous (so Koerner 1993: 552) since the law 
has just specified that he receives an equal share.
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to his adoptive father, and second that the adoptive mother but not the 
natural mother is treated as having a child.23
IV
In his final section Maffi examines an inscription from Tegea con-
taining an edict (diagramma) of Alexander with provisions for the re-
turn of exiles in 324.24 Two passages in the edict, lines 4-9 and 48-57, 
contain rules about the returning exiles recovering their patroia or 
matroia, and about women who remained in Tegea or returned ear-
lier keeping possession of whatever patroia or matroia they had. These 
raise many difficult issues concerning the ownership of patroia and 
matroia, which Maffi treats at some length. Because his conclusions 
are necessarily somewhat speculative, and because it does not appear 
that the rules concerning patroia and matroia at Tegea in 324 were 
similar to those at Gortyn more than a century earlier,25 I leave this 
document out of consideration here, noting only Maffi’s general con-
clusions, that the edict illustrates how the law regulated the matroia 
both within the family and in the larger context of the community, 
and that it reveals the continuity of matroia and patroia over time. He 
also suggests that the privileged role of the matroia may be a feature 
of the Doric family structure. I would say that all these conclusions are 
problematic, but this would take me too far from the subject of this 
paper, the property of women at Gortyn.
Part B
The following response to Maffi’s response concentrates on new 
points that he makes or new ideas his comments have inspired in me. 
I begin with some general considerations.
Maffi accuses me of following the general principle that “whatever 
is not prohibited by the law is allowed,” but he himself seems to follow 
the principle that “whatever is not allowed by the law is prohibited.” 
My interpretation of the laws from Gortyn is based on three premises: 
first, although some sections of the Code (and perhaps of other Gor-
tynian laws) are relatively comprehensive and well organized (most 
notably 1.2-2.2 on status and ownership disputes, and 10.33-11.23 on 
adoption), the “Code” as a whole (a term I use for convenience) is nei-
ther systematic nor comprehensive. Most provisions address specific 
situations, probably because they were creating conflict or uncertain-
ty, and we must always ask what is the purpose of any law we seek to 
understand. Second, I believe that the laws at Gortyn try to provide 
23. I will pass over Maffi’s speculations (105-6) about a further problem not 
directly addressed by the Code, concerning the adopted son re-entering his 
natural family; as far as I can see, this has nothing to do with women’s property.
24. SIG 360; IPArk 5 (Thür and Taeuber 1994: 51-70); Heisserer 1980: 204-29.
25. It appears from lines 4-9, for example, that women only possessed 
property if they were unmarried and had no brothers.
88 Michael Gagarin
rational, practical solutions to the issues they address and do not im-
pose unreasonable burdens on people for no good reason.
Third, I try to understand the meaning of specific provisions with-
out the sort of preconceptions about the socio-economic position of 
Greek women in general that clearly govern Maffi’s interpretations of 
specific provisions. He makes this clear in sections 1-2, where he pre-
sents the subject in terms of Doric or Attic models for Greek women; 
apparently he does not think it possible that Gortynian women con-
formed to neither model. Here I note merely the simple fact that the 
word matroia (“beni materni”) occurs only in Crete in the archaic and 
classical periods and only in Arcadian Tegea in the Hellenistic period. 
This suggests that women at Gortyn may not have conformed to either 
an Attic or a Doric model. At the very least, we should begin with an 
open mind on this.
Now some specific issues. Numbers at the beginning of a paragraph 
refer to the numbers in Maffi’s response.
8, 15, 41, 43, 44. The regulations in 6.2-12 prohibit one person from 
selling property (and other transactions) that belongs to another per-
son; more specifically, a husband or son cannot sell his wife’s or moth-
er’s property (6.9-12). Maffi further believes that Gortynian women 
could not themselves sell their own property. The only exception 
made by the law is in order to pay a debt (9.1-7, 11.31-45). But the 
assumption that Gortynian women themselves cannot sell their own 
property has no basis in the law. It cannot be supported by the law 
prohibiting a son from selling his mother’s property because the same 
law also prohibits a son from selling his father’s property (6.2-5) and 
Maffi agrees that a father can sell his own property. Maffi argues that 
when the law allows the sale of a woman’s property to pay a debt, it 
implies that sale is prohibited for any other purpose. But both of the 
laws allowing sale to pay a debt (9.1-7, 11.31-45) have the clear pur-
pose of providing for the payment of any debt left behind by someone 
who has died. The second passage has the additional purpose of pre-
venting the estate of one parent from being used to pay the debts of 
the other. Therefore it mentions both the paternal estate and the ma-
ternal estate in connection with paying the debts of a deceased. The 
provision certainly does not imply that the paternal property could 
not be sold for any purpose except to pay a debt; nor does it imply this 
about the maternal property. Thus neither passage implies anything 
about the sale of a woman’s property in general, and if anything, the 
second passage in particular implies that women, like men, could nor-
mally sell their own property.
Consider, moreover, what would happen if Maffi is correct that 
women could not sell their own property. We know that women in-
curred debts (11.31-45). How did this happen? Presumably a woman 
borrowed money. Could she sell property to repay the debt while she 
was alive? If she could not, no one would ever lend a woman money 
because he would know that he would probably have to wait until she 
died in order to be repaid. If, on the other hand, a living woman could 
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sell property to pay a debt, then she could sell her property whenever 
she wished. She would first have to borrow money from someone (per-
haps the buyer) and then she could sell the property in order to repay 
the debt. In practice, then, she could sell any property she wished, 
though the process would be a bit complex. But it seems far more like-
ly that the law in 6.9-12, prohibiting a husband/son from selling his 
wife’s/mother’s property, takes for granted that the woman may sell 
the property herself if she wishes.
10, 11. I admit that the details of the suit that is the subject of 6.12-
31 (and the similar suit in 9.7-24) are uncertain, but Maffi and I agree 
that the woman who owns the property is the plaintiff. I think she sues 
her husband, the seller, Maffi thinks she sues the buyer. Whichever is 
correct, the woman is clearly bringing suit on her own without the par-
ticipation of a kyrios, because her husband, who would be her kyrios in 
the system Maffi envisions, would not want her suit to succeed.26 That 
women could appear as litigants in court on their own is supported by 
other evidence (e.g., the laws on divorce in 2.45-3.16), though in all such 
cases Maffi can always, if he wishes, summon other hypothetical rela-
tives (never mentioned in the laws) to represent her. In my view, how-
ever, a woman’s ability to litigate in court by herself is completely con-
sistent with her owning “her own” property by herself, without a kyrios.
30. In my articles I have several times made the point that although 
in my view Gortynian women owned and could administer their own 
property by themselves, it seems that they often allowed men to ad-
minister it for them, a situation that can be paralleled in many West-
ern countries in the recent past, and even today. Maffi responds that if 
the legislator had wanted to introduce norms favoring the autonomy 
of women, he would have made this explicit. Since the law is silent 
on this point, Maffi concludes that the “traditional customs and prac-
tices” remained in effect. He further argues that from 6.9-31 we can 
deduce the principle that a woman’s property was always adminis-
tered by a male relative. To all this I would respond first, that the leg-
islator’s purpose in 6.9-31 is to protect women’s property from misuse 
by men so that his silence on other matters is not troubling; second, 
that Maffi assumes that the traditional customs and practices at Gor-
tyn were those we know from Athens (and perhaps Sparta), though 
there is no reason in my view to assume this; and third, that 6.9-31 
prohibit misuse of a woman’s property by men but give no support 
to the conclusion that men always (or even usually) administered a 
woman’s property.
30, 45. Maffi recognizes that the law explicitly allows a wife (and 
a husband) to give komistra (whatever this is) up to the value of 12 
staters. In his view this is another exception (in addition to paying 
a debt) to the rule that a woman cannot dispose of her own prop-
26. This is obvious if the husband is the defendant, but even if the buyer is the 
defendant, the husband would want not his wife’s suit to succeed, as this would 
amount to convicting the husband of violating the law.
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erty. However, if a woman was prohibited by law from disposing of 
her property, then the law in 3.37-40 would have to say “a woman may 
give komistra but not more than 12 staters.” But this is not what the 
law says. As written (“If the husband or the wife wish to give komistra, 
. . . “), it treats both spouses equally, and its purpose is clearly to limit 
the amount of komistra for both spouses. It assumes that a woman can 
dispose of her property just as it assumes that her husband can. In 
neither case is the law allowing something that might otherwise be 
prohibited.
31, 32. In my earlier papers I cite the law in 9.1-7 as the clear-
est proof that a woman could administer property herself. The law 
addresses the matter of paying the debts of the deceased when his 
only survivor is an heiress. It states that the heiress “either herself 
(autan) or through her paternal and maternal relatives” is to sell or 
mortgage property in order to pay the debt. My view remains that 
the first alternative means that the heiress would sell the property 
all by herself without the help of relatives; Maffi’s view is that sell-
ing the property “herself” would require the participation of a kyri-
os. I have responded that since the kyrios would almost certainly be 
a relative, there would be no reason for the lawgiver to say “either 
herself (that is through her kyrios who is a relative) or through her 
relatives.”
Maffi now suggests that reason for the alternatives given in the law 
is that the first would apply to heiresses after puberty and the second 
to heiresses before puberty. This seems to me quite plausible, and if 
true, it lends further support to my view, because the only plausible 
reason for distinguishing between the heiress before and after puber-
ty is that before puberty she is too young to manage such transac-
tions by herself, whereas after puberty she is able to do so. If we ac-
cept Maffi’s view that the heiress would have a kyrios both before and 
after puberty, her age would make no difference and the law would 
have no reason to make this distinction. It would simply read, “the 
heiress is to sell or mortgage property.” It might add “through her 
kyrios” or “through her relatives” if this were thought to be necessary, 
but there would be no reason at all to distinguish between pre- and 
post-puberty. Maffi argues that the criteria for choosing a kyrios were 
different pre- and post-puberty, but so what? If the heiress needed a 
kyrios in order to sell property, it would make no difference how this 
kyrios was selected. Thus I continue to understand “herself” as mean-
ing by herself, without help, and I accept Maffi’s suggestion that she 
probably would act alone after puberty but her relatives would act for 
her before puberty.
37. Maffi seeks to explain the limitation on gifts from a son to his 
mother as protecting a third party, either the heirs or the creditors of 
the donor. The son’s heirs, however, would eventually inherit from his 
mother (their grandmother in most cases) and thus would not need 
such protection. As for creditors, the law, which imposes a limit of 
100 staters of these gifts, would not serve to protect creditors in many 
cases. A poor son could give all the money he had (which would be less 
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than 100 staters) to his mother to avoid paying a creditor, and a rich 
son could easily give much more than this and still pay all his credi-
tors. Thus I continue to think that a son gave money to his mother just 
because he wanted to, probably in most cases because she was living 
by herself and needed the money.
38, 39. I have argued that in a divorce, when a wife took with her 
half of the produce from her property and half of what she wove, she 
would often take an amount of money equivalent to this rather than 
the actual produce and woven products. Maffi thinks she took the ac-
tual goods. Even if he is correct, surely there would be times when 
the produce or the woven products would be more than the woman 
herself needed; the woven products in particular would sometimes in-
clude clothing she had woven for her children or husband that would 
be of no use to her. If Maffi is also correct in thinking that women 
could not sell their property (except to pay debts), then a woman 
would be required to take goods with her that were of no use to her 
and that she could not dispose of. I cannot believe that the legislator 
created such a situation.
42. The law in 3.40-44 says that in a divorce or after her husband’s 
death a serf woman “is to have her own things (τὰ ϝὰ αὐτᾶς ἔκεν),” 
but if she carries away more than this, it is a matter for trial. Maffi 
argues that the serf woman’s “own property” is actually her master’s 
property and that the law, which he thinks applies only to serf cou-
ples with different masters, ensures that the woman’s master recovers 
his property. I continue to think that “her own things” is an unlikely 
way to refer to the property of a woman’s master. I also note that on 
Maffi’s interpretation the law does not, in fact, protect the woman’s 
master, because there is no provision for a trial if, for whatever rea-
son, the serf woman takes less than “her own things” or even takes 
nothing at all with her. The law only provides for a trial if she takes 
more than her own things.
48. I end by noting Maffi’s concluding sentence because I think it 
makes clear the difference between his approach and mine. “There-
fore, I continue to believe, beyond any disagreement about the lit-
eral interpretation of single provisions of the laws, that the criteria 
on the basis of which the judicial condition of Gortynian women 
should be understood ought not to be too distant from a socio-
economic picture that includes many elements common to other 
areas of Greece at this time.” For me, this statement shows once 
more that Maffi’s view of women at Gortyn is guided by a picture of 
women elsewhere in Greece, especially in Athens, and that he inter-
prets individual provisions of the law in such a way as to conform 
to this picture, even if this results in improbable understandings of 
the meaning of the Greek and irrational or impractical legislation. 
I prefer to start with the text of the laws and understand this as 
best I can, regardless of whether it fits any preconceived picture of 
women in other parts of Greece.
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